SURVEY OF RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
IN NEW JERSEY LAW
In this section, the Seton Hall Law Review presents synopses of
recent United States and New Jersey Supreme Court cases of interest to
practitioners. In so doing, we hope to assist the legal community in
keeping abreast of some of the more interesting changes in significant
areas of practice.
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BANKING LAW-FEDERAL PREEMPTION-NEw JERSEY STATE LAW
PROHIBITING FEDERALLY-INSURED BANKS FROM CHARGING LATEFEES DOES NOT CONFLICT WITH FEDERAL LAw, THEREFORE, THE

NEW JERSEY STATE LAw Is NOT PREEMPTED-Hunter v.

Green-

wood Trust Co., 143 N.J. 97, 668 A.2d 1067 (1995).
This case presents facts similar to Sherman v. Citibank (South
Dakota), N.A., 143 N.J. 35, 668 A.2d 1036 (1995), a companion case
decided the same day. 143 N.J. at 100, 668 A.2d at 1069. James H.
Hunter was the named party in a class action suit brought on behalf of a group of New Jersey credit-card holders challenging the
lawfulness of overdue-payment fees issued by the defendant, the
Greenwood Trust Company. Id. at 100-01, 668 A.2d at 1069. The
defendant is a Delaware chartered federally-insured state bank. Id.
at 100, 668 A.2d at 1069.
Plaintiffs argued that New Jersey's Retail Installment Sales Act
(RISA) prevented federally-insured state banks from charging overdue-payment fees to credit-card customers. Id. at 101, 668 A.2d
1069 (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:16C-50 to -54 (West 1995) (since
amended, L. 1995, c. 43)). Plaintiffs also contended that the defendants violated NewJersey's Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) through
their advertising and card-member agreements. Id. (citing N.J.
STAT. ANN. §§ 56:8-2 to -19 (West 1995)). Finally, the plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant's overdue-payment fees constituted
both conversion and a breach of contract. The plaintiffs' reasoning rested upon the theory that the term "interest" did not include
late-payment fees.
Relying on the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDA), the defendant argued that it was permitted to charge late-payment fees in New Jersey. Id. (citing 12
U.S.C.A. § 1831d). The defendant supported its position by noting
that the DIDA empowered federally-insured state banks to charge
interest rates equal to those permitted by the state in which the
bank was located. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831d(a)). Specifically,
the defendant relied upon a portion of the DIDA which preempts
state law when a conflict exists. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C.A. § 1831d(a)).
The defendant concluded its claims by asserting that the RISA was
in conflict with the DIDA and therefore should be preempted. Id.
(citation omitted).
The plaintiffs' initial complaint was dismissed by the Law Division. Id. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed the decision of
the law division. Id. (citation omitted). The New Jersey Supreme
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Court granted certification and reversed the holding of the appellate division. Id. The supreme court held that New Jersey's usury
laws, which prohibit banks from charging overdue-fees, were not in
conflict with the DIDA and consequently the DIDA did not preempt the RISA. Id.
Joined by Chief Justice Wilentz, Justice Stein and Justice Coleman, Justice Handler authored the opinion for the majority. Id. at
100, 114, 668 A.2d at 1069, 1076. In his introduction, Justice Handler explained that in order for federal preemption of state law to
occur there must exist a genuine conflict, as opposed to a hypothetical or potential one. Id. at 102, 668 A.2d at 1069 (citations
omitted). An actual conflict, the court noted, occurs when an individual is unable to simultaneously conform with both federal and
state law. Id. (citations omitted). Justice Handler emphasized the
importance of courts attempting to blend potentially conflicting
federal and state laws when possible. Id., 668 A.2d at 1069-70 (citations omitted). The court insisted that the federal preemption of
state law is not favored unless Congress has clearly articulated its
intent to do so or no other option exists. Id., 668 A.2d at 1070
(citations omitted).
Next, Justice Handler examined the relevant text of the DIDA
and noted its similarity with a portion of the text of the National
Bank Act (NBA). Id. at 103, 668 A.2d at 1070 (citation omitted).
Justice Handler explained that federal agencies and courts alike
have granted federally-insured banks the same immunity from state
usury laws under the DIDA that national banks have enjoyed under
the NBA. Id. (citations omitted).
Therefore, the court concluded, the meaning of "interest"
should be consistent as it is used by the DIDA and the NBA. Id.
(citations omitted). Justice Handler referred to the New Jersey
Supreme Court's unwillingness to include late-fees in its interpretation of "interest" in the Sherman decision. Id. (citing Sherman, 143
N.J. at 45-60, 668 A.2d 1036) (other citations omitted). Based on
Sherman,Justice Handler concluded that "interest" did not encompass overdue-fees as the term is used in the DIDA. Id.
The court emphasized that while both the DIDA and the NBA
specifically refer to "interest," neither mentions any other charges
in relation to lending money. Id. at 104, 668 A.2d at 1070. In support of the majority's position, Justice Handler examined the legislative history of the DIDA and concluded that Congress merely
intended to preempt state usury laws with regard to conventional
interest, not other charges. Id. (citations omitted). The court ad-
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ded that state consumer protection was also a primary consideration in determining whether state usury laws are preempted. Id.
The court addressed the defendant's reliance upon regulatory
agencies in its interpretation of "interest." Id. at 105, 668 A.2d at
1071. In consideration of the defendant's position, the majority
concluded that the defendant was entitled to less deference because no regulatory agency had established a consistent interpretation of "interest." Id. (citations omitted). In support of this
conclusion, the court emphasized that neither the Federal Deposit
Insurance Company (FDIC), nor the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency (OCC) have established a clear-cut interpretation of
"interest" in relation to the NBA and the DIDA. Id. at 105-06, 668
A.2d at 1071 (citations omitted).
Next, Justice Handler cited the New Jersey State Bank Parity
Act (BPA) which forbids state banks from charging overdue-payment fees as interest. Id. (citing N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 17:13B-1 to
-2 (West 1995)) (citations omitted). The majority addressed the defendant's contention that state banks are permitted to assess overdue-fees to credit-card customers pursuant to the BPAjust as New
Jersey Credit Unions are permitted to do. Id., 668 A.2d at 1071-72
(citing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:13-104(b) (West 1995)). The court rebutted the defendant's argument by noting that although the BPA
establishes parity between the interest rates of credit unions and
banks, the BPA does not permit state banks to assess fees other
than conventional interest. Id. at 106-07, 668 A.2d at 1072 (citation
omitted). The court explained the congressional reasoning behind permitting smaller credit unions to charge overdue-fees by
noting that credit unions service only their own members and are
unable to allocate expenditures like a bank. Id.
The court concluded that because no evidence exists that
Congress intended to preempt state usury laws, there is no conflict
between the RISA and the DIDA. Id. Thus, the court held that the
defendant is prohibited from charging state customers overduefees. Id.
In concluding the majority opinion, Justice Handler acknowledged a May 26, 1995, amendment to the RISA statute which allows
retail charge account holders to assess late-payment fees to consumers, thereby seemingly permitting state banks to charge latepayment fees. Id. (citation omitted). The court determined that
the late-payment fees with regard to the plaintiffs in this action
were assessed prior to the date the amendment became effective,
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and therefore the subsequent amendment had no effect. Id. at
107-08, 668 A.2d at 1072.
Justice Pollock authored a zealous dissent in which Justice Garibaldi joined. Id. at 108, 668 A.2d at 1072 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
Justice Pollock recognized that the primary issue in the case was
whether overdue-payment fees could be construed as "interest."
Id., 668 A.2d at 1073 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
In reviewing the language of the NBA and the DIDA, Justice
Pollock articulated that both statutes permit interest to be charged
in accordance with the laws of the state in which the bank is located. Id. at 108-09, 668 A.2d at 1073 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Justice Pollock then reviewed the claims of both the plaintiffs and the
defendant. Id. In particular, Justice Pollock noted that the plaintiffs argued that should federal preemption occur, only their statutory claims should be preempted, not their common-law claims.
Id.
Next, Justice Pollock undertook the task of defining the term
"interest" as it is used in the DIDA and the NBA. Id. Justice Pollock proffered that because "interest" was not explicitly defined in
either the DIDA or the NBA, an analysis of congressional intent
was necessary to ascertain its scope. Id. (citations omitted).
Commencing with a historical inquiry of the NBA, Justice Pollock explained that the NBA was created to protect the national
banking structure from harsh state usury laws. Id. Justice Pollock
continued the analysis by noting that the Supreme Court of the
United States determined that a national bank, under the authority
of the NBA, could charge customers the highest interest rates
found in the domiciled state because it was the intent of Congress
to make a powerful national banking system. Id. at 110, 668 A.2d at
1073 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citing Tiffany v. National Bank of Missouri, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 409, 411-13 (1873)).
Justice Pollock continued this dissent by noting that more
than a century after the Tiffany decision, the Supreme Court of the
United States permitted a national bank based in one state to
charge customers in another state the highest rates permissible in
the bank's home state. Id. (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citing Marquette
Nat'l Bank v. First of Omaha Serv. Corp., 439 U.S. 299 (1978)). Noting that the Marquette decision created an imbalance between national and state banks, Justice Pollock explained that the
enactment of the DIDA rectified any imbalance that was created.
Id., 668 A.2d at 1074 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted).
As Justice Handler noted in the majority opinion, Justice Pol-
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lock recognized the similarity of the language used in the relevant
sections of the NBA and the DIDA. Id. Justice Pollock concluded
that the goal of both the NBA and the DIDA was to protect national banks and federally-insured state banks from the discrimination caused by harsh state laws. Id. at 111, 668 A.2d at 1074
(Pollock, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Pollock agreed with the majority's position that a uniform understanding of the term "interest" is necessary to avoid
conflicts such as the one presented in this case. Id. (citations omitted). As had been previously expressed injustice Pollock's Sherman
dissent, the justice argued that the meaning of "interest" as the
term is used in the DIDA includes overdue-payment fees. Id. (citing Sherman, 143 N.J. at 90-91, 668 A.2d 1036 (Pollock, J.,
dissenting)).
Justice Pollock supported this position by noting that the
FDIC, the regulatory agency responsible for the supervision of federally-insured banks, had interpreted the term "interest" as it is
used in the DIDA to include late-payment fees. Id. at 111-12, 668
A.2d at 1074 (Pollock,J., dissenting). When a term is not explicitly
defined by Congress, Justice Pollock argued, the applicable administrative agency's translation should be accepted. Id. at 112, 668
A.2d at 1074 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
Justice Pollock next addressed the issue of preemption by noting that traditionally, congressional intent controls. Id., 668 A.2d
at 1075 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). The express
preemption clause contained within the DIDA, Justice Pollock
stated, was clearly indicative of Congress's intent to preempt all
conflicting state statutes. Id. at 112-13, 668 A.2d at 1075 (Pollock,
J., dissenting).
Continuing, Justice Pollock analyzed whether the RISA's ban
on late-fees conflicted with the DIDA. Id. Justice Pollock determined that both the NBA and the DIDA conflicted with NewJersey
state laws prohibiting the assessment of overdue-payment fees. Id.
Consequently, Justice Pollock opined, the plaintiffs' claim should
be preempted by federal law. Id.
Moreover, Justice Pollock maintained that the NewJersey BPA
permits state banks to charge late-payment fees under the guise of
interest. Id. (citation omitted). Justice Pollock concluded that because state banks were permitted to charge late-payment fees, any
law prohibiting federally-insured out-of-state banks from charging
the same fees is discriminatory. Id. (citation omitted).
Justice Pollock addressed the plaintiffs' contention that all
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common-law claims should survive any federal preemption. Id.Justice Pollock explained that the plaintiffs' reasoning was based upon
a United States Supreme Court decision in which the Court determined that the preemptive power of the DIDA was limited to state
statutes or state constitutions. Id. (citing Cipollone v. Liggett Group,
Inc., 505 U.S. 504 (1992)).
Justice Pollock disagreed with the plaintiffs' interpretation of
Cipollone and noted a subsequent United States Supreme Court decision that clarified Cipollone. Id. (citing FreightlinerCorp. v. Myrick,
114 S. Ct. 1483, 1487-88 (1995)). Justice Pollock argued that
Freightlinerestablished that Cipolone does not prohibit federal preemption where Congress has provided an express preemption
clause as is the case in the DIDA. Id. (citing Freightliner,114 S. Ct.
at 1488 (1995)). Justice Pollock determined that the plaintiffs'
common-law claims were preempted because they conflicted with
the DIDA. Id.
Finally, Justice Pollock argued that because the DIDA supersedes any conflicting state law, no state may limit the amount of
overdue-payment fees as was suggested by the majority in Sherman.
Id. at 114, 668 A.2d at 1075-76 (Pollock, J., dissenting) (citing Sherman, 143 N.J. at 90-91, 668 A.2d 1036). Justice Pollock concluded
the dissent by stating that the defendant was permitted to impose
late-fees under the authority of the DIDA because it preempted
RISA. Id.
In a separate dissent, Justice O'Hern relied upon the dissent
as written in Sherman. Id. (O'Hern, J., dissenting) (citing Sherman,
143 N.J. 35, 668 A.2d 1036).
As Justice Pollock expressed, without a clear interpretation of
the phrase "interest" in either the DIDA or the NBA, the supreme
court must look to congressional intent. It was the design of Congress to create a powerful national banking system. In doing so,
Congress enacted the DIDA and the NBA to safeguard the national
banking system from overly destructive state laws. This congressional desire to protect the national banking system was evidenced
by the express preemption clause contained in the DIDA. In this
case, the New Jersey Supreme Court was presented with the very
situation Congress was attempting to guard against when it enacted
the DIDA and the NBA. An inflexible majority failed to recognize
the congressional intent in the DIDA and the NBA and conse-
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quently federally-insured state banks have been harshly discriminated against by these provisions of the RISA.
Matthew Baldini
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Department of Law & Public
Safety v. Gonzalez, 142 NJ. 618, 667 A.2d 684 (1995).
TION MAY BE PRESENTED-State

In New Jersey, the casino industry is governed by a two-tiered
regulatory structure comprised of the Casino Control Commission
(Commission) and the State Division of Gaming Enforcement (Division). 142 N.J. at 624, 667 A.2d at 687. The Commission acts as
the quasi-judicial licensing organization, and the Division operates
as the prosecutorial and investigatory body as promulgated in N.J.
Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12-63 and 5:12-76, respectively.
In accordance with the Casino Control Act (Act), N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 5:12-90(f), Adriel Gonzalez was issued a casino-employee license by the Commission which enabled him to be employed as a
security guard for the Sands Hotel and Casino. On September 5,
1990, while in possession of the license, Gonzalez was indicted on
charges of possession of marijuana with an intent to distribute and
the attempted sale of marijuana in a school zone to an undercover
agent. On October 22, 1990, Gonzalez pled guilty to these charges.
Gonzalez was sentenced on November 30, 1990, to serve a period
of thirty days in the Atlantic County Jail and a term of probation
thereafter.
On September 17, 1991, the Division, in an attempt to revoke
Gonzalez's casino-employee license, filed a complaint with the
Commission based on these convictions. In April 1992, one of the
commissioners, acting as a hearing examiner, reviewed the complaint. Gonzalez testified at the hearing that despite his guilty plea,
he did not commit the offenses with which he was charged. Id. at
624-25, 667 A.2d at 687.
Initially, the examiner revoked Gonzalez's casino-employee li-
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cense in June 1992; however, the case was remanded by the full
Commission for further proceedings. Id. at 625, 667 A.2d at 687.
In September 1992, the second hearing was conducted. Although
the Division objected vehemently, Gonzalez was once again permitted to testify to entering a false plea of guilty to the drug offense
charges.
Gonzalez explained to the hearing examiner that he could not
afford to hire a private attorney to represent him and therefore
decided to plead guilty in order to dispose of the situation as expeditiously as possible. The examiner, in adopting Gonzalez's testimony, concluded that Gonzalez was rehabilitated and reinstated
his casino-employee license. In affirming this decision, the Commission concluded that during the course of a license revocation
proceeding, guilty pleas are considered voidable admissions and
may be repudiated. Id. at 623, 633, 667 A.2d at 686, 692.
On appeal, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
reversed the judgment of the Commission. Id. at 623, 667 A.2d at
686. The court ruled that a casino employee is not entitled to contest his or her conviction during an administrative revocation proceeding. Id. The court based its decision on the doctrine of issue
preclusion and the doctrine of judicial estoppel. Id. at 625, 667
A.2d at 687. In dissent, one panel member stated that issue preclusion is in fact an equitable doctrine and, therefore, absent any contrary legislative intent, the Commission should be permitted to
utilize its discretion in determining whether a prior judicial determination ought to be precluded. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in considering the case on
appeal, affirmed the appellate division's judgment. Id. at 623, 667
A.2d at 686-87. The court held that strong public policy exists in
favor of maintaining the integrity of the casino industry and, therefore, during an administrative license revocation proceeding, a casino employee may not offer evidence to challenge the validity of
his or her convictions. Id. The court further held that although a
casino employee may present evidence to prove that he or she has
been rehabilitated, the evidence must not contradict any elements
of the crimes to which he or she has entered guilty pleas. Id., 667
A.2d at 687.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice Coleman focused on
the Commission's method of executing its adjudicatory responsibilities in deciding whether rehabilitation occurred. Id. at 627, 667
A.2d at 688. The court noted its limited judicial capacity in reviewing the Commission's action and stated that review of the adminis-
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trative decision was confined to whether the Commission's action
expressly or impliedly violated the legislative policies of the Act.
Id., 667 A.2d at 688, 689. Justice Coleman posited that in order to
determine whether the legislative policies had been violated, the
court would have to interpret the Act. Id., 667 A.2d at 689. The
doctrine of probable legislative intent, the court noted, applied to
the circumstances of this case. Id. at 628, 667 A.2d at 689.
The justice began the court's analysis of ascertaining the Legislature's intent through legislative findings. Id. Justice Coleman
succinctly stated that the cornerstone of the legislative regulation
of Atlantic City's casino gambling is public trust and confidence in
the integrity and reliability of the State's regulatory process. Id.
(citing N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 5:12-lb(6), 5:12-lb(13)). Moreover, the
court explained that the legislative findings demonstrate that by
excluding the participation of individuals with criminal records or
associations, the integrity of the casino industry will be maintained.
Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-lb(7)). The justice articulated that
due to the strong public policy of the Legislature, a license that is
issued to a casino employee may be revoked if it is determined that
the employee is no longer qualified to be licensed. Id. (citing NJ.
Stat. Ann. § 5:12-lb(8)).
Justice Coleman recognized that casino gambling is an exception to the general prohibition against gambling as provided in the
New Jersey Constitution. Id. (citing N.J. CoNST. art. IV, § 7,
2
(1947)). Therefore, the court stressed that the state's strong interest in fostering ethical conduct by casino employees and highly regulating gambling has been recognized in order to maintain public
trust and confidence in the integrity of the casino industry. Id. at
628-29, 667 A.2d at 689. The justice emphasized that in order to
preserve the integrity of the industry, the Act has established extraordinary, intense, and pervasive regulations over casino operations. Id. at 629, 667 A.2d at 689.
Notwithstanding these extraordinary regulations, Justice Coleman further recognized that the Commission does have legislatively defined discretion in order to implement the Act. Id. The
justice opined that the Commission's discretion may not be utilized
in such a way that would violate the Act's public policy. Id. Rather,
the court continued, the Commission must be conscientious of the
fact that the casino industry is to be protected from criminals in
order to uphold its integrity. Id. Justice Coleman concluded that
the Commission's actions undermined the underlying policy of the
Act. Id., 667 A.2d at 689-90.
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Next, Justice Coleman addressed an additional reason why
Gonzalez should not be able to renounce his guilty pleas. Id. at
630, 667 A.2d at 690. The justice recognized that Gonzalez entered his guilty pleas under oath in accordance with NEW JERSEY
COURT RuLEs R.3:9-2. Id. The court explained that this rule requires ajudge to reject a guilty plea if the judge is not satisfied that
the plea has been made voluntarily, has not been coerced, and that
the person understands the consequences which will result from
entering the plea. Id. After acknowledging that Gonzalez never
attempted to vacate his pleas, Justice Coleman posited that a guilty
plea is equivalent to an admission of guilt. Id. Therefore, when
considering the Act as a whole, the court concluded that a casino
employee is not entitled to rescind his or her guilty plea in order to
establish that he or she has been rehabilitated in accordance with
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-90h. Id.
In accordance with the legislative intent of barring criminals
from the industry of casino gambling, Justice Coleman further denounced the Commission's decision of allowing repudiation of a
guilty plea as a means of establishing rehabilitation. Id. at 631, 667
A.2d at 690. The justice explained that repudiation of guilty pleas
would have detrimental effects on the public's confidence not only
in the industry, but in the judiciary as well. Id.
The court next turned its attention to the doctrine of judicial
estoppel. Id. at 631, 667 A.2d at 691. Significantly, the justice
stated that judicial estoppel precludes a party involved in a legal
proceeding from claiming a position that is inconsistent with one
that the party has previously asserted. Id. at 632, 667 A.2d at 691.
The court noted that by entering guilty pleas to the drug offenses,
Gonzalez benefitted by receiving a lenient sentence, yet subsequently denounced his guilt at the license revocation proceeding
in order to retain his casino-employee license. Id. Justice Coleman
concluded that such actions are precluded by the doctrine of judicial estoppel, which serves to protect the integrity of both the industry of casino gambling as well as the judicial process when the
Commission is acting in its quasijudicial capacity. Id.
Finally, the court denounced the Commission's assertion that
when determining whether an individual has been rehabilitated in
accordance with N.J. Stat. Ann. § 5:12-90h, the Legislature did not
expressly state and, therefore, did not intend to bar the relitigation
of facts that underlie ajudgment of conviction that has been based
on a guilty plea. Id. Justice Coleman reiterated that a sensible
reading of the Act enables one to conclude that the Legislature's
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intent was to preclude criminals from obtaining employment in
the casino industry. Id.
The court ultimately held that collaterally attacking a judgment of conviction in a license revocation proceeding of a casino
employee is not permitted. Id. at 633, 667 A.2d at 691. Justice
Coleman concluded that in an employee license revocation proceeding, an employee may present facts which relate to the surrounding circumstances of the conviction; however, this evidence
may not contradict any of the elements which constitute the disqualifying offense. Id., 667 A.2d at 692.
The NewJersey Supreme Court wisely affirmed the decision of
the appellate division. The court recognized that the Commission,
by allowing casino employees to relitigate the facts underlying a
guilty plea for a disqualifying offense at a license revocation proceeding, unequivocally undermined the public policy behind the
Casino Control Act-specifically, to maintain integrity in the gaming industry. The court's holding reflects an accurate and concise
translation of the legislative intent which underlies the Act. The
holding firmly stands behind the intent of the legislature to insulate criminals from the casino industry.
By its decision, the court demonstrated foresight in allowing
casino employees to challenge the validity of guilty pleas from
prior criminal convictions would have detrimental effects on the
public's confidence in the casino industry. Thus, the decision of
the court serves to foster ethical conduct by casino employees. In
essence, the court has attempted to maintain and protect the cornerstone of the legislative regulation, the public's trust, and confidence in the integrity of both the casino industry and the judiciary.
Cynthia L. Corcoran
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In 1982, Ralph Muellenberg, Dario Passerini, and Kurt Burg
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formed Bikon Corporation (Bikon) to promote and sell Muellenberg's patented inventions in the United States and Canada.
143 N.J. at 171, 669 A.2d at 1383. Pursuant to the stockholder's
agreement, each of them would be a director and an officer of
Bikon; Muellenberg would serve as president. Muellenberg, Passerini, and Burg each subscribed to 100 shares of Bikon stock for
$30,000, but only Muellenberg invested cash. Id. at 172, 669 A.2d
at 1383. According to Muellenberg, the division of responsibilities
was clear at the outset: he would control the company, Passerini
would be treasurer, and Burg would be Bikon's general manager.
Id., 669 A.2d at 1384.
Business operations began in Burg's New Jersey home and
subsequently moved to New York when Burg purchased a house
there. Because Burg was the only officer present on a regular basis,
he handled the daily business of Bikon. Disputes eventually arose
between Muellenberg and Burg about the company's product line,
the patent and trademark royalties, the rental payments to Burg,
Muellenberg's access to company reports, and other sundry matters. Id. at 172-73, 669 A.2d at 1384.
Muellenberg filed suit in the chancery division, contending
that Bikon was deadlocked. Id. at 173, 669 A.2d at 1384. He
sought dissolution of Bikon and other relief. Burg counterclaimed, seeking to divest Passerini of his shareholder status and to
compel a sale of Muellenberg's stock in the corporation to Burg.
Burg then received notice of a meeting of the directors and
shareholders to consider dissolution. The chancery division, on his
application, enjoined any attempt to dissolve; the meeting proceeded without Burg. Passerini and Muellenberg voted to declare
a $180,000 dividend, to hire an independent accountant to compute accrued royalties, to require Muellenberg's signature for all
bank withdrawals, and to necessitate Board approval of purchases
exceeding $1,000. Assuming that they had recovered control of
Bikon, Muellenberg and Passerini continued their motion to
purchase Burg's stock but dismissed all other court actions. Id. at
173-74, 669 A.2d at 1384.
The New Jersey Superior Court, Chancery Division, ruled that
defendant Burg had established a triggering event under Tide 14A,
section 12-7 of the New Jersey Statutes Annotated ("the statute"),
which authorizes a compulsory buyout of stock or dissolution of a
corporation if a minority shareholder's rights have been oppressed. Id. at 174, 669 A.2d at 1384-85. The actions of Muellenberg and Passerini at the shareholders' meeting, the court
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reasoned, amounted to oppression. Id. Therefore, the court held
that the only equitable remedy was to allow one or more of Bikon's
shareholders to purchase the stock owned by the others. Id., 669
A.2d at 1385. Under the circumstances, the chancery division decided to order Muellenberg and Passerini to sell their interests to
Burg. Id.
On appeal, the NewJersey Superior Court, Appellate Division,
reversed the trial court's judgment. Id. The appellate division
opined that the trial court's finding of oppression was premature.
Id. at 175, 669 A.2d at 1385. First, the appellate division noted that
the remedies of buyout or dissolution are terminal; therefore,
courts should be averse to ordering them without first exhausting
less severe alternatives. Id. Secondly, the court observed that the
parties might have resolved their differences had they been given
more time. Id. And finally, because a coerced sale of stock from
majority shareholders to a minority shareholder runs afoul of corporate majoritarian principles, the court stressed that such relief
should only be granted in extraordinary situations. Id.
Burg petitioned the New Jersey Supreme Court for certification, maintaining that the appellate division erroneously narrowed
the scope of the statute, incorrectly applied majoritarian principles
of corporate governance to a close corporation, and improperly
rejected the trial court's decision. Id. The New Jersey Supreme
Court reversed the decision of the appellate division, finding that
the oppression requirement of the statute had been satisfied. Id. at
181-82, 669 A.2d at 1388-89. The supreme court held that in exceptional cases, courts may force majority shareholders of a close
corporation to sell their shares to oppressed minority shareholders.
Id. at 170, 669 A.2d at 1382.
Writing for a unanimous court, Justice O'Hern began the
court's analysis by examining the nature of close corporations. Id.
at 176, 669 A.2d at 1385. Close corporations, Justice O'Hem
stated, are unique because their shareholders are usually involved
in the day-to-day affairs of the business. Id. Because shareholders
are typically family members or friends who depend on the company for their primary income, thejustice remarked, they are more
prone to serious conflicts than their counterparts in publicly-held
corporations. Id., 669 A.2d at 1385-86.
The supreme court also recognized that minority shareholders
in a close corporation are particularly vulnerable because majority
shareholders always determine how business will be conducted.
Id., 669 A.2d at 1386. If dissension develops over the majority's
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decisions, the court noted, the controlling shareholders may freeze
out the minority by firing them, excluding them from decision
making, and decreasing their compensation. Id.
Minority shareholders' vulnerability is compounded, the court
added, by the illiquidity of their investment. Id. The court pointed
out that minority shareholders cannot liquidate their shares in the
public market or, like a partnership, unilaterally dissolve the legal
relationship. Id. Thus, the court deduced that minority shareholders who object to the majority's policies are faced with a Catch-22;
they can neither safely remain with the corporation nor profitably
leave because the controlling shareholders are the only realistic
buyers. Id. at 176-77, 669 A.2d at 1386. For these reasons, the
supreme court concluded that it is easy for majority shareholders
of a close corporation to frustrate the reasonable expectations of
minority shareholders. Id. at 177, 669 A.2d at 1386.
Justice O'Hern next furnished an historical overview of American courts' approaches to protecting minority interests in corporations. Id. The justice stated that courts had traditionally been
loath to intervene in a corporation's internal affairs. Id. But some
courts, the justice observed, discerned the singular nature of minority interests in close corporations and imposed a heightened
duty of loyalty on the shareholders. Id.
The supreme court also discussed the role of state corporations statutes in protecting minority shareholders from exploitation. Id. at 178, 669 A.2d at 1386. Historically, these statutes were
not very helpful, the court emphasized, because they failed to distinguish close corporations from public corporations. Id. And, the
court noted, New Jersey did not amend the Corporation Business
Act to grant specific protection to minority interests until 1973.
Id., 669 A.2d at 1387. The court recounted that the amendment
added the current language in section (1) (c) of the statute, empowering courts to order the sale of stock or dissolution of a close
corporation if the controlling shareholders oppress or act unfairly
toward minority shareholders. Id.
After surveying the early interpretation of section (1) (c), Justice O'Hern formulated the legal framework that courts should use
in determining whether minority shareholders have suffered oppression. Id. at 178-79, 669 A.2d at 1387. The justice explained
that courts must probe the understanding of all parties at the time
of incorporation and determine what expectations these parties
had about their respective roles in the organization. Id. at 179, 669
A.2d at 1387. When majority conduct undermines the fair expecta-
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tions of minority interests, Justice O'Hern asserted, it is deemed
oppressive. Id. The justice continued that this fact-sensitive inquiry is flexible enough to appreciate the differences in expectations between shareholders of small corporations and those of
public corporations. Id. The justice underscored, however, that
the bases for relief under section (1) (c) are circumscribed because
minority shareholders are aware of their precarious position when
they first invest in a close corporation. Id. at 179-80, 669 A.2d at
1387-88.
With this framework in place, the supreme court considered
whether the actions of Muellenberg and Passerini were oppressive.
Id. at 180, 669 A.2d at 1388. Because there was no dispute over the
majority's handling of corporate salaries, dividends, or funds, the
court stated that the remaining criterion of oppression is whether
Burg's reasonable expectations have been fulfilled. Id. The court
then enunciated the expectations of a minority shareholder in a
close corporation: appreciation of investment, secure employment
in a managerial position, and a voice in the organization's objectives. Id. at 180-81, 669 A.2d at 1388. In the present case, the
supreme court posited that Burg's fair expectation upon leaving
his prior employment to join Bikon was that he would enjoy a significant role in managing the company. Id. at 181, 669 A.2d at
1388.
The justice next examined the shareholders' meeting to decide if it amounted to oppression. Id. Justice O'Hern acknowledged that the equities were close. Id. On the one hand, the court
argued, Burg had contributed greatly to the company's prosperity
and could not have anticipated being frozen out after ten years as
Bikon's general manager. Id. at 181-82, 669 A.2d at 1388. On the
other hand, Justice O'Hern maintained, Muellenberg and Passerini could not fairly have expected to be ignored in business decisions. Id. at 182, 669 A.2d at 1388-89. The court conceded that the
appellate division's solution to the impasse would have been
favorable in other circumstances. Id., 669 A.2d at 1389. But the
court specified that subsequent events had vindicated the trial
court's prediction of Burg's inevitable ouster from the company.
Id. Thus, the justice concluded, the chancery division's decision to
order the sale of stock should not be disturbed. Id.
Additionally, the supreme court had to determine whether
Muellenberg and Passerini or Burg should survive with Bikon. Id.
The supreme court noted that the 1988 amendment to N.J.S.A.
§ 14A:12-7(8) expressly permits minority shareholders to obtain a
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court order for the buyout of majority shareholders. Id. In most
situations, the court indicated, only the controlling shareholders
will have sufficient funds to consummate a stock purchase. Id.
Nevertheless, the court judged that there was ample evidence on
behalf of Burg to justify the chancery division's ruling. Id. at 18283, 669 A.2d at 1389.
Therefore, the supreme court held that although most
buyouts ordered pursuant to section (1) (c) will be in favor of controlling shareholders, section (8) authorizes a buyout by minority
interests in rare situations. Id. at 183, 669 A.2d at 1389. In this
case, the court continued, Muellenberg and Passerini have demonstrated their ability to remain in the American market, compete
with Burg, and thereby fulfill their expectations in forming Bikon.
Id. at 183-84, 669 A.2d at 1389-90. For these reasons, the supreme
court concluded, the judgment of the trial court was fair and equitable to all parties. Id. at 184, 669 A.2d at 1390.
The decision in this case demonstrates the willingness of the
New Jersey Supreme Court and the Legislature to emphasize substance over form in corporations law. Although close corporations
and publicly held corporations share the legal characteristics of
limited liability and perpetuity of existence, close corporations
have the distinct disadvantage of facilitating majority exploitation
of minority interests through freezeouts. This is because most corporate statutes were crafted with an eye towards the public corporation, and their indiscriminate application to close corporations
often leads to the frustration of shareholders' legitimate
expectations.
And although close corporations and partnerships are similar
in substance, their legal forms are quite different. Partnership statutes are supplementary; hence, partnership law is largely contractual in nature and affords parties flexibility in determining the
rules that will govern their relationship. Corporations law, however, is regulatory, and it is questionable whether internal agreements are enforceable. To resolve this dilemma, the Legislature
passed sections (1) (c) and (8) of the statute. The supreme court,
mindful of the competing interests of majority rule in corporate
governance and the protection of minority shareholders' expectations, discerningly limited their application to extraordinary cases.
In this age of injudicious judiciaries, would that more were as sensible in their approach to corporate law.

Daniel A. Ippolito
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-A POLICE OFFICER ACTING PURSUANT
OUT

KNOWING

THE

TO A VALID ARREST WARRANT WITH-

UNDERLYING

OFFENSE

FOR WHICH

THE

WARRANT WAS ISSUED HAS THE RIGHT TO FOLLOW A FLEEING
SUSPECT INTO A PRIVATE RESIDENCE AND ENTER THE PREMISES

Is NOT REQUIRED TO FIRST KNOCK AND ANNOUNCE His OR
HER PRESENCE-State v. Jones, 143 N.J. 4, 667 A.2d 1043 (1995).

AND

On the night of October 15, 1989, Peter Katsihtis parked his
car across the street from his apartment in the Stony Hill Inn parking lot. 143 NJ. at 7, 667 A.2d at 1045. Upon his return in the
morning, Katsihtis discovered that his car had been burglarized.
Id. at 7-8, 667 A.2d at 1045. Katsihtis reported the break-in to the
Hackensack Police and listed his wallet, driver's license, social security card, cassette tapes, and floor mats as stolen.
On October 18, 1989, Hackensack police officers Michael
Mordaga and Robert Wright were surveilling an area near an apartment building located at 370 Park Street. Id. at 8, 667 A.2d at 1045.
While conducting the surveillance investigation, Mordaga and
Wright witnessed the defendant and a companion, Lonnie Collier,
pull into the complex's parking lot. Mordaga recognized Collier
from several prior encounters and also recalled seeing an outstanding arrest warrant for Collier earlier that evening. At the time Morgada first observed Collier and the defendant, he did not know the
specific offense underlying the arrest warrant. Later, Mordaga
learned that the underlying offense concerned Collier's failure to
pay fines imposed for two drug possession convictions.
Once observing Collier and the defendant, Mordaga and
Wright exited the police car and approached the two men, who
then fled. In his brief to the New Jersey Supreme Court, the defendant contended that he and Collier began running before
Mordaga informed them of the outstanding warrant. Conversely,
Mordaga claimed that it was after he informed Collier of the arrest
warrant that the two men fled the scene. It is undisputed, however,
that the defendant and Collier both knew that Wright and
Mordaga were with the police department. Id. at 9, 667 A.2d at
1045.
As the defendant and Collier fled, the police officers immediately chased after them. The defendant and Collier entered the
apartment building, climbed the stairs, and ran into apartment 312
with the officers following them. The record demonstrates that the
officers attempted to open the door, determined it was locked, and
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then kicked it down. The record does not reflect, however,
whether the officers knocked and announced their presence prior
to entering the apartment.
Once inside, Mordaga discovered drug paraphernalia and paper documents strewn on the kitchen table. The paper documents
included the items Peter Katsihtis had reported stolen two days earlier: his driver's license, social security card, bank card, and vehicle
registration. Mordaga and Wright additionally confiscated a crowbar that they also observed on the table. Id., 667 A.2d at 1045-46.
The officers then arrested the two men, gave them their Miranda
rights, and escorted them to the police station. Id., 667 A.2d at
1046.
Upon his arrival at the police station, the defendant expressed
his desire to cooperate with the police. The defendant admitted
that he and Collier had been involved in several auto theft crimes
during which the defendant drove the getaway car. Sergeant
Mordaga re-Mirandized the defendant but summoned Detective
Krakowski to conduct the investigation. Detective Krakowski interviewed the defendant the next morning, at which point the defendant waived his rights and implicated himself and Collier in the
Katsihtis robbery. Id. at 9-10, 667 A.2d at 1046.
The police charged the defendant with first degree robbery,
burglary, heroin possession, and receiving stolen property. After
his indictment, the defendant attempted to suppress the evidence
obtained from the apartment as well as the statement he made to
the police after his arrest. Additionally, the defendant moved to
have the charges severed at trial. The trial court denied defendant's motion to suppress and permitted the admittance of the physical evidence and defendant's oral statement. Id. at 10-11, 667 A.2d
at 1046. The lower court did find for the defendant on his second
motion and ordered the various counts of the indictment to be
severed. Id. at 11, 667 A.2d at 1046. Therefore, the defendant was
only tried on the Katsihtis burglary charge and was subsequently
found guilty.
The defendant appealed his conviction to the New Jersey Superior Court, Appellate Division. Id. In reversing the defendant's
conviction, the appellate division found the case analogous to the
circumstances in State v. Bolte. Id. (citing State v. Bolte, 115 N.J.
579, 560 A.2d 644, cert. denied, 493 U.S. 936 (1989)). In Bolte, the
court noted, an officer's warrantless entry into a home where the
officer was in "hot pursuit" of an individual suspected only of motor vehicle and disorderly person charges constituted an unreason-
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able search and seizure. Id. (citation omitted). The appellate
division, relying on Bolte, held that Mordaga and Wright unlawfully
entered into Collier's apartment and that the evidence obtained as
a result was a product of an unreasonable search and seizure. Id. at
12, 667 A.2d at 1047.
The New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification and reversed the decision of the appellate division. Id. In a unanimous
decision, the court held that an officer acting pursuant to an arrest
warrant, without knowing the underlying offense for which the warrant was issued, has a right to follow a fleeing suspect into a private
residence and enter the premises and is not required to announce
his presence. Id. at 15, 667 A.2d at 1050.
Writing for the court, Justice Garibaldi began the analysis by
reviewing state and federal law on warrantless searches of property
under the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution
and Article I of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 12, 667 A.2d at
1047. The court first noted that a clear distinction exists between a
warrantless search and a search conducted pursuant to a warrant.
Id. at 13, 667 A.2d at 1047. The justice explained that requiring a
police officer to obtain a warrant safeguards citizens by placing the
probable cause determination with a neutral and detached magistrate. Id. Therefore, the justice observed, a police officer acting
pursuant to a valid arrest warrant has the authority to execute the
warrant by entering the home to search for the suspect, provided
probable cause exists that the suspect is there. Id.
The majority then turned to an analysis of the issuance of a
warrant pursuant to N.J. Court Rule 3:3-1. Id., 667 A.2d at 1048.
The court indicated that a magistrate's issuance of a warrant suggests that the suspect is possibly wanted for a serious offense or has
disregarded less intrusive means. Id. The court contrasted the issuance of a warrant with that of a summons where the gravity of the
offense is significantly less severe. Id. at 13-14, 667 A.2d at 1048.
Justice Garibaldi emphasized that a warrant, and not a summons,
was issued in the present case and the actions of the officers were
based on that warrant. Id. at 14, 667 A.2d at 1048. The justice
noted that had the officers failed to act on the warrant they would
have been in abrogation of their duties under Rule 3:3-1. Id.
Relying on both statutory and decisional law, the majority next
tackled the lawfulness of the officer's entry into the apartment. Id.
First, the court criticized the appellate division's failure to understand the distinction between the officer's entry here, in accordance with a valid warrant, and the officer's warrantless entry in
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Bolte. Id. at 14-15, 667 A.2d at 1048 (citing Welsh v. Wisconsin, 466
U.S. 740 (1984)). The court then briefly discussed the Supreme
Court's decision in Welsh v. Wisconsin. Id. In Welsh, the justice
noted, the Court held that a police officer's warrantless entry into a
private home to arrest an individual for a minor motor vehicle offense was unreasonable. Id. at 15, 667 A.2d at 1048 (citing Welsh,
466 U.S. at 742).
In comparison, the court stressed that the officers in the case
sub judice entered a private residence to arrest a suspect, also for a
minor offense, but acted pursuant to a valid arrest warrant that a
neutral and detached magistrate issued. Id., 667 A.2d at 1048-49.
Based upon the valid warrant, Justice Garibaldi noted that the officers had limited authority to enter the premises and arrest Collier, provided reasonable grounds existed that Collier was there.
Id., 667 A.2d at 1049.
Next, the court castigated the appellate division for creating
an unworkable standard that failed to permit police officers to follow a fleeing suspect into a private home unless equipped with a
warrant based on a non-minor offense. Id. at 16, 667 A.2d at 1049.
The appellate division's approach, according to Justice Garibaldi,
would only serve as a means to restrict police officers in their duties
while simultaneously encouraging a suspect's flight. Id. Moreover,
the justice indicated that the appellate division's standard completely ignored the function of the magistrate to make an independent probable cause determination. Id. The court further
observed that it would be equally unreasonably to require an officer to know the specific offense underlying the warrant, as the
appellate division suggested. Id.
Continuing its criticism of the appellate division's holding, the
majority stressed the impracticability and unenforceability of a distinction between serious and minor offenses. Id. Justice Garibaldi
indicated that such an approach would require a case-by-case examination which would result in the undue delay of a suspect's apprehension. Id. (citing Welsh, 466 U.S. at 761). Moreover, the
justice emphasized that the appellate division's holding provides
no guidance as to what exactly constitutes a minor offense. Id. at
16-17, 667 A.2d at 1049.
In concluding its analysis of the appellate division's holding,
the court looked to New Jersey Supreme Court and United States
Supreme Court precedent. Id. at 17, 667 A.2d at 1049-50. Relying
on the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision in State v. Bruzzese,
Justice Garibaldi highlighted that compelling an officer to differen-
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date between a warrant for a serious offense and a warrant for a
minor offense would be unreasonable in light of the importance
that attaches to a warrant being issued. Id. (citation omitted).
Moreover, the justice stressed that requiring such a distinction to
be made would unduly hamper the police's primary responsibility
to arrest individuals sought on outstanding warrants. Id., 667 A.2d
at 1050. The justice finally added that so long as an officer acts
reasonably and in accordance with a validly issued arrest warrant,
the arrest and any evidence seized as a result of that arrest is admissible. Id.
Justice Garibaldi next addressed the officers' alleged failure to
knock and announce their presence when they entered Collier's
apartment. Id. at 18, 667 A.2d at 1050. The justice explained that
the recent Supreme Court decision in Wilson v. Arkansas recognized that an unannounced entry may be reasonable if motivated
by legitimate law enforcement interests. Id. (citation omitted).
The justice noted further that the Wilson decision vested authority
in the lower courts to decide the circumstances under which an
officer's unannounced entry is reasonable. Id. (quotation
omitted).
Turning to the present case, the court emphasized that requiring Mordaga and Wright to knock and announce their presence
where the defendant and Collier both knew that they were being
chased was obviously futile. Id. Moreover, the court highlighted
that the suspects purposely ran into the apartment to specifically
avoid getting arrested. Id. In addition, the court underscored that
the officers were familiar with the defendants and knew of Collier's
previous drug offense convictions. Id. at 19, 667 A.2d at 1050.
Therefore, the court held that even if Mordaga failed to announce
his presence, there was no violation of the common-law knock and
announce requirement. Id. at 18, 667 A.2d 1050.
Faced with deciding between efficient law enforcement or protection of individual rights, the NewJersey Supreme Court surprisingly has chosen to find in favor of law enforcement. As the
appellate division indicated, the circumstances in the present case
were strikingly similar to the circumstances in State v. Bolte. Id. at
11, 667 A.2d at 1046. Specifically, the officer in Bolte made a warrantless entry into a suspect's home to effect an arrest for numerous motor vehicle and disorderly person offenses, just as Officer
Mordaga did in this case. Id. (citation omitted).
Although Officer Mordaga was acting in accordance with a
valid arrest warrant, circumstances in this case and Bolte concerned
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the same underlying offenses-non-minor motor vehicle violations. Unfortunately, Justice Garibaldi refused to extend the logic

of Bolte to the present case and found the officer's warrantless entry
reasonable. In so doing, the court has given police officers essentially unlimited authority to routinely enter private residences by
force to effectuate arrest warrants for minor offenses.
Danielle Priola

EVIDENCE-WrTNESSES-HYPNOTICALLY-RFRESHED

TESTIMONY IS

NOT PER SE INADMISSIBLE; HOWEVER, SUCH TESTIMONY WILL BE
DEEMED INADMISSIBLE WHERE THE HYPNOTIST IMPROPERLY REFRESHES WITNESS'S RECOLLECTION OF EVENTS IN VIOLATION OF

State v. Hurd-State v. Fertig,134 N.J. 115, 668 A.2d 1076 (1996).
On December 12, 1969, a robbery occurred at a restaurant in
Hamilton Township, NewJersey. 134 NJ. at 117, 668 A.2d at 1077.
During the course of the robbery, the owner of the restaurant was
killed. Twenty-two years thereafter, law enforcement officials indicted defendant, Frank Fertig. Vital to the State's proof against
defendant was the admission of testimony offered by Dennis Spier,
who had allegedly driven defendant to the restaurant on December 12, 1969.
On March 20, 1991, Spier, after obtaining "conditional immunity," indicated that he drove a man to the restaurant, but that he
did not recollect the man's name. Id. at 118, 668 A.2d at 1077.
Spier described the man as approximately five-feet-eight-inches tall

and thin. Spier, consistent with statements offered by the patrons
and employees at the restaurant, stated that defendant wore gloves
and a ski mask and was carrying a burlap bag. Spier also claimed to

remember that the defendant carried a firearm. Upon being
shown a photographic array including the defendant's picture,
however, Spier was unable to identify the defendant.
Five days later, during a subsequent interview, Spier stated to
the police that the man whom he had driven to the restaurant was
named either "Fred" or "Frank." Id. at 118-119, 668 A.2d at 1078.
The police conducted a third interview with Spier on April 17,
1991. Id. at 119, 668 A.2d at i078. At this third interview Spier
unequivocally stated that the man he had driven to the restaurant
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was named "Fred" or "Frank" and that the man possessed a firearm, wore a ski mask and carried a bag. Thereafter, on May 29,
1992, an Atlantic County Prosecutor's Office investigator interviewed Spier for pre-trial preparation. During the course of that
meeting, Spier revealed to the investigator that he had, through
the help of one Dr. Babcock, undergone hypnosis. Moreover,
Spier could not differentiate between his actual memory and what
was induced by the hypnosis. After learning about the hypnosis,
the State instantly informed the trial court. After adjourning the
trial of the defendant, a hearing was conducted to determine the
admissibility of the hypnotically-refreshed recollection of Spier.
The trial court's hearing was centered on an analysis of the
requirements set forth in State v. Hurd. Id. at 117, 668 A.2d at 1077
(citing State v. Hurd, 86 NJ. 525, 432 A.2d 86 (1981). Specifically,
the trial court held Spier's testimony to be inadmissible. Id. at 123,
668 A.2d at 1080. As a threshold issue, the trial court determined
that Spier had been hypnotized based on several facts, namely:
Spier himself believed that he had been hypnotized; Spier had
used hypnosis tapes in the past; and Spier's complaint of unusual
numbness in his hands after the hypnosis was completed. Id. The
trial court then deemed the testimony as violative of Hurd because
Dr. Babcock was told that the purpose of the hypnosis was to induce Spier to remember as much detail as was possible, and thus
Dr. Babcock was questionably independent. Id. The trial court further found that Dr. Babcock's questioning, when coupled with the
known purpose of the hypnosis, was highly suggestive and structured, therefore violating Hurd. Id.
The State's appeal of the trial court's decision was denied by
the appellate division. Id. at 117, 668 A.2d at 1077. Subsequently,
the New Jersey Supreme Court granted certification. Id. (citation
omitted).
Justice Pollock, writing for a unanimous court, affirmed the
decision of the trial court, deeming Spier's testimony inadmissible.
Id. Justice Pollock began the court's analysis with a revisitation of
Hurd. Id. at 119, 668 A.2d at 1078. Specifically, the justice recanted the several inherent problems with hypnotically-refreshed
testimony. Id. (citation omitted). Among such problems, declared
Justice Pollock, are that the person being hypnotized is subject to
suggestion, loses critical judgment, and tends to confuse memories
brought out under hypnosis with past recollection. Id. at 119-20,
668 A.2d at 1078 (citations omitted). The justice stated that because of these inherent problems, it is extremely difficult for the
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factfinder to judge the credibility of a witness's memory. Id. at 120,
668 A.2d at 1078 (citation omitted).
Justice Pollock, while setting forth these problems, indicated
that a per se rule of inadmissibility with respect to such testimony is
unnecessarily broad as it would bar the admission of trustworthy
evidence in certain situations. Id. Justice Pollock noted that the
Hurd court adopted several procedural safeguards to ensure that
the admitted testimony is trustworthy. Id. First, noted the justice,
the session must be completed by either a psychologist or psychiatrist who may qualify as an expert in a court of law. Id., 668 A.2d at
1078-79 (citing Hurd,86 N.J. at 545-46, 432 A.2d 86 (footnote omitted). Second, the court stated, the hypnotic session should be
conducted independent of any judicial proceeding. Id., 668 A.2d
at 1079. Third, continued the justice, any information that the
hypnotist receives, from either the State or defense, must be recorded. Id. Fourth, Justice Pollock reminded, before inducing
hypnosis, a detailed description of the facts should be given by the
subject to the hypnotist, and the hypnotist should thereafter avoid
influencing the subject's recollection through the addition of new
details or structured questions. Id. at 121, 668 A.2d at 1079. The
fifth requirement, noted Justice Pollock, is that every contact between the subject and the hypnotist must be recorded. Id. Finally,
recalled the justice, the only people to be present during any phase
relating to the hypnotic session are the subject and the hypnotist.
Id.
Continuing, Justice Pollock noted that Hurd placed the burden of establishing admissibility by clear and convincing evidence
on the party seeking to introduce the testimony. Id. (citation
omitted). The justice then looked to the trial court record to determine whether the requirements set forth in Hurd were satisfied.
Id. at 121123, 668 A.2d at 1079-80. Justice Pollock revealed that
during the trial court's hearing, there were conflicting expert opinions as to both Spier's ability to be hypnotized and the manner in
which Spier was hypnotized. Id. at 122-23, 668 A.2d at 1080. Justice Pollock made note of the fact that the nature of Spier's memory loss was due to the passage of time and therefore a threshold
doubt existed in the case regarding the usefulness and validity of
the hypnosis session. Id. at 123, 668 A.2d at 1080. Justice Pollock
held that the record was replete with sufficient, substantial, and
credible evidence to uphold the trial court's factual findings. Id.
(citations omitted).
Next, Justice Pollock, presented with several corollary issues,
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rejected the State's contention that the defendant, who urged the
exclusion of the hypnotically-refreshed testimony, must bear the
burden of proving Spier's hypnosis. Id. at 123-24, 668 A.2d at 1080.
Justice Pollock reaffirmed the notion, as set forth in Hurd, that the
burden of proof must rest with the party offering the hypnoticallyrefreshed testimony. Id. at 124, 668 A.2d at 1080.
Justice Pollock next addressed several requests made by the
defense. Id., 668 A.2d at 1080-81. The justice first noted that the
defense asked the court to reexamine Hurd and adopt a per se rule
of inadmissibility, or alternatively, to require courts to instruct juries about the inherent problems of such testimony. Id. Justice
Pollock refused to expressly address either after noting that the
defense failed to raise these issues at the trial court. Id., 668 A.2d
at 1081. Justice Pollock, however, deemed it necessary to note the
significant developments throughout American jurisprudence
since the Hurd decision. Id.
Justice Pollock indicated that since Hurd twenty-six courts now
hold that hypnotically-refreshed testimony is per se inadmissible.
Id. at 124-25, 668 A.2d at 1081 (citing Thomas M. Fleming, Annotation, Admissibility of Hypnotically Refreshed or Enhanced Testimony, 77
A.L.R. 4th 927, 943-47 (1990) (collecting cases)) (other citations
omitted). Justice Pollock next noted that the Hurd decision relied
on the recommendations of a doctor who now believes that the
procedural safeguards, promulgated in Hurd, are insufficient to
protect against hypnotically-tainted testimony. Id. at 125, 668 A.2d
at 1081 (citation omitted). Only four states, announced the justice,
consider hypnotically-refreshed testimony to be generally admissible. Id. (citations omitted). While acknowledging the flaws in admitting hypnotically-refreshed testimony under Hurd, Justice
Pollock refused to abandon Hurd, absent a more complete record.
Id.
Justice Pollock, continuing the court's analysis, looked to the
federal court's treatment of post-hypnotic testimony. Id. The justice noted that the federal courts will use a totality-of-the-circumstances test. Id. (citations omitted). Thejustice noted that several
state courts have also adopted this test. Id. Under the totality-ofthe-circumstances test, maintained the justice, courts must consider numerous factors such as the procedural safeguards, the nature of memory loss, the presence of suggestive statements and the
ability to substantiate the testimony with independent evidence.
Id. at 125-26, 668 A.2d at 1081. Justice Pollock noted that the
courts adopting the totality-of-the-circumstances test agree with the
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reasoning of Hurd, that a per se rule of inadmissibility may serve to
exclude otherwise reliable evidence. Id. at 126, 668 A.2d at 1081.
Next, the court bolstered Hurdby revealing other jurisdictions
which use similar safeguards as those alluded to in Hurd. Id. (citations omitted). Furthermore, Justice Pollock refuted the position
taken by otherjurisdictions that because hypnotically-refreshed testimony is not generally accepted by the scientific community, such
testimony is inadmissible. Id. at 126-27, 668 A.2d at 1081-82 (citations omitted). Instead, maintained Justice Pollock, the current
test of expert testimony is whether the testimony evolved from
sound methodology which could be supported by a consensus of
experts in the particular field. Id. at 127, 668 A.2d at 1082.
Concluding, Justice Pollock reiterated the point made in
Hurd, that persons who have been hypnotized are susceptible to
the hypnotist's intentional or inadvertent suggestions. Id. Moreover, continued the justice, the hypnotized person will often lose
judgment while under hypnosis, tend to confuse hypnotic recall
with waking memory, and proliferate his or her confidence in the
testimony after hypnosis. Id. (citing Hurd, 86 N.J. at 539-40, 432
A.2d 86). Therefore, ordered Justice Pollock, courts should, upon
admitting hypnotically-refreshed testimony, instruct juries as to the
possible effects hypnosis may impose on the testimony. Id. Justice
Pollock indicated, however, that the court would request the Committee on Model Criminal Jury Instructions to create the appropriate charge. Id.
It is surprising that the Supreme Court of New Jersey, which
for the most part operates on the cutting edge of our nation'sjurisprudence, appears to be lagging behind and reluctant to follow the
majority of other states which rule that hypnotically-refreshed testimony is inadmissible. Justice Pollock, while hinting that the court
could someday join this majority, expressly refused to overrule
Hurd, thus ensuring the admission of such tenuous evidence.
Moreover, the court seems somewhat unconcerned with how hypnotically-refreshed testimony is viewed byjuries. While Justice Pollock noted the possible vulnerabilities of hypnotically-refreshed
testimony, the court merely restated its findings in Hurd and failed
to remedy any of the problems that have arisen with hypnoticallyrefreshed testimony since Hurd. In light of these recent problems,
hopefully the court will, in the near future, decide to hear a case
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which will enable the NewJersey courts to realign with the majority
of jurisdictions barring hypnotically-refreshed testimony.
Douglas A. Stevinson

BANKING

LAW-PREEMPTION-NON-INTEREST

RATE

LENDING

TERMS, INCLUDING LATE- PAYMENT FEES, IMPOSED UPON NEW
JERSEY CREDIT CARD HOLDERS

By

NATIONAL

BANKS ARE

SUBJECT

To, AND ILLEGAL UNDER, NEW JERSEY LAw-Sherman v. Citibank, 143 N.J. 35, 668 A.2d 1036 (1995).
New Jersey creditcard holders initiated a class action suit
against Citibank, a national credit-card issuer, charging that the
bank imposed late-payment fees upon cardholders in violation of
state law. 143 N.J. at 44, 668 A.2d at 1040. Initially, plaintiffs alleged that NewJersey's Retail Installment Sales Act of 1960 (RISA)
expressly prohibited national credit-card issuers from charging
cardholders late-payment fees. Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 17:16C50 to -54). Secondly, plaintiffs contended that Citibank violated
New Jersey's Consumer Fraud Act (CFA) when the bank failed to
disclose in its consumer contracts and advertising that late payment
charges violated NewJersey law. Id. (citing N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 56:8-2
to -19). Lastly, plaintiffs argued that, under common-law principles, Citibank committed conversion and breach of contract by imposing the fees.
In defending the imposition of late-payment fees, Citibank relied upon provisions of the National Bank Act (NBA), a federal
statute. Id. (citing 12 U.S.C. § 85). Under the NBA, the bank asserted, national banks are permitted to export the interest rates
allowed under the laws of the state in which the banks are
chartered to other states where cardholders reside, thereby preempting local usury laws. Id.
Pointing to its charter in South Dakota, Citibank asserted that
South Dakota usury law includes late-payment charges within its
definition of interest and allows imposition of such extra fees in
the event of consumer default. Id. Thus, the bank argued, because
the NBA relies on a bank's charter state to establish limits on interest fees and South Dakota includes late fees within its definition of
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interest, the charges to plaintiffs were permissible and New Jersey
usury law was preempted. Id.
Citibank immediately filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
and the New Jersey Superior Court, Law Division, granted the motion with prejudice. Id. On appeal, the appellate division affirmed
the ruling. Id. The New Jersey Supreme Court subsequently
granted plaintiffs' petition for certification. Id. Reversing the appellate court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, the New Jersey
Supreme Court, in a four-to-three decision, determined that Citibank's late payment charges against plaintiffs were illegal under
the RISA. Id. at 45, 668 A.2d at 1040. The majority further held
that such charges were not "interest" for purposes of the NBA and,
therefore, New Jersey's prohibition of late fees was not preempted
by federal law. Id.
Writing for the majority, Justice Handler, joined by Chief Justice Wilentz and Justices Stein and Coleman, set the stage for the
court's analysis by recounting the relationship between federal and
state law in the area of banking and usury. Id., 668 A.2d at 1040-41.
The justice recognized that the court must begin by presuming
that Congress did not intend to preempt state law. Id., 668 A.2d at
1041. Justice Handler further asserted that courts must demonstrate even greater restraint where the situation involves issues traditionally resolved by state law. Id.
Citing extensive authority, the majority determined state usury
laws regulating lending practices to be a division of consumer protection, which has been traditionally considered a province of state
law. Id. at 46, 668 A.2d at 1041. That tradition, the court maintained, coupled with the absence of an express preemption clause
in the NBA, requires production of compelling evidence of intent
to displace state law to overcome the presumption against preemption. Id.
Initially, Justice Handler conceded that the NBA effectively
preempted state usury law with regard to the establishment of interest rates by allowing national banks to charge cardholders in any
state the interest rate allowed under the laws of the individual
bank's charter state. Id. at 47, 668 A.2d at 1041-42. The justice
then asserted, however, that the term "interest" must be defined to
determine whether the term is broad enough to envelop contingent loan terms such as late payment fees. Id., 668 A.2d at 1042.
Surveying the legislative and historical bounds of the term, the
court found no persuasive authority for expanding "interest" beyond its plain meaning as a periodic percentage rate. Id. at 51-56,
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668 A.2d at 1043-46. Congress's concern in enacting the NBA, the
majority surmised, was centered on simple percentage interest
rates. Id. at 51, 668 A.2d at 1043. Additionally, the court cited hesitation by Congress, in enacting the NBA, to override state law even
in that limited area. Id. Therefore, the court concluded, Congress
did not contemplate inclusion of contingent loan terms in the definition of "interest" as applied to the NBA. Id. at 52, 668 A.2d at
1044.
The majority next turned its attention to case law from other
jurisdictions on which Citibank relied in defending the action. Id.
at 52-53, 668 A.2d at 1044. The majority generally dismissed the
case law as inapplicable, citing the lack of express language broadening the definition of "interest" to include contingent loan terms
such as late-payment fees. Id. at 52-56, 668 A.2d at 1044-46. The
court, however, specifically declined to follow recent case law from
California that confronted the same issue as that before the court.
Id. at 56-57, 668 A.2d at 1046.
The court disagreed with the California Supreme Court's
broad interpretation of interest as enveloping late-payment fees as
well as that court's reasoning that allowing states to regulate national banks would permit state banks to unfairly favor local banks
over national banks. Id. (citation omitted). The majority refuted the
California court's latter concern, pointing out that the NBA currently prohibits state discrimination against national banks. Id. at
57, 668 A.2d at 1046.
Justice Handler proceeded to address Citibank's and the dissent's reliance upon a recent interpretive ruling proposed by the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), the agency responsible for enforcement of the NBA. Id., 668 A.2d at 1046-47.
Although, generally, an agency's interpretive ruling of a statute
should be granted deference, the justice recited that far less deference is appropriate where an agency fails to espouse consistent interpretations. Id. at 57-58, 59, 668 A.2d at 1047. Statutory
construction, the majority resolved, is ultimately the duty of the
court. Id. at 58, 668 A.2d at 1047.
Refusing to focus solely on the most recent OCC interpretation of interest, the court reviewed all the OCC's rulings as a
whole, dating back to 1964. Id. at 59, 668 A.2d at 1047. Finding
the OCC's interpretations to be conflicting, the majority decided
that the agency's rulings were not pertinent to a thoughtful determination of the scope of "interest". Id. at 60, 668 A.2d at 1048.
The court noted that if a broader understanding of interest was
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appropriate under the NBA-one that would include
nonpercentage rates such as late-payment fees-that responsibility
was within the scope of Congress. Id.
The majority next turned to New Jersey's banking statutes for
guidance in ascertaining the appropriate definition of "interest".
Id. at 61, 668 A.2d at 1048. The court found it significant that
these statutes treated percentage-rate interest separately from
more discrete loan terms such as late-payment fees. Id., 668 A.2d at
1048-49. Buttressing this observation, the court reiterated that the
RISA specifically prohibits banks from imposing late-payment fees
when the lender is charging the consumer interest. Id. at 62, 668
A.2d at 1049. These statutes, the majority concluded, demonstrate
the dissimilar nature of percentage-rate interest and contingent financial charges, such as late-payment fees. Id.
The court proceeded to address Citibank's final argument. Id.
at 66, 668 A.2d at 1051. The court concluded that the bank's position that national banks should be permitted to impose late-payment fees because New Jersey credit unions were granted an
exception under RISA was unsubstantiated under the NBA. Id. Citibank's allegation of discrimination, the majority asserted, has no
foundation in the law. Id. Under the NBA, the court explained, a
bank is allowed to export the interest rate authorized by its charter
state to customers in any other state. Id. The majority emphasized
that this statute does not bestow upon national banks the ability to
charge late payment fees just because certain New Jersey institutions is authorized to do so. Id. at 66-67, 668 A.2d at 1051.
Adopting such an interpretation, the court articulated, would
effectively allow national banks to impose the highest rate of interest allowed under its charter state law or customer's state law. Id.
Furthermore, the justice concluded, a national bank would be permitted to accompany such interest with any additional charges allowed for any lending entity under the banks' charter state law or
customer's state law. Id. Such an allowance, the court maintained,
extends beyond the scope of the NBA as intended by Congress. Id.
at 67, 668 A.2d at 1051.
In enacting the NBA, the majority reasoned, Congress intended to protect national banks from state usury laws requiring
national banks to charge different percentage interest rates than
local banks, thus giving state banks a competitive advantage regarding interest rates. Id. at 68-69, 668 A.2d at 1052-53. The majority
concluded that Congress's intent to deter state discrimination
against national banks was limited to percentage-rate interest, em-
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phasizing that the states have a fundamental interest in controlling
noninterest-rate lending terms and maintaining consumer credit
protection. Id.
Finally, Justice Handler addressed the future implications of
the court's holding, in light of the recent passage of an amendment to the RISA, allowing lenders to impose late payment fees up
to ten dollars. Id. at 70-71, 668 A.2d at 1053-54. The justice acknowledged that state and national banks would now be authorized to charge the same fees held to be illegal in the case at bar. Id.
at 71, 668 A.2d at 1054. Justice Handler cautioned, however, that
even under the new legislation, New Jersey retains its authority to
regulate all noninterest-rate lending terms of a bank, national or
local. Id.
In an impassioned dissent, in which Justice Garibaldi joined,
Justice Pollock expressed disappointment in the majority's adoption of a limited definition of "interest". Id. at 72, 668 A.2d at 1054
(Pollock, J., dissenting). Conceding that the NBA fails to expressly
define the term, the justice looked to the history of national banking for guidance. Id. at 75, 668 A.2d at 1055-56 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Justice Pollock gleaned from this history that, over the years,
Congress has passed laws favoring national banks in an effort to
strengthen the national banking system, even when such legislation
was at the expense of local banks. Id. at 76-77, 668 A.2d at 1056-57
(Pollock, J., dissenting). Therefore, the justice surmised, adoption
of an expansive definition of "interest" is appropriate and necessary to fulfill the legislative intent of the NBA. Id. at 78-80, 668
A.2d at 1057-58 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
Justice Pollock placed specific reliance on the OCC's proposed interpretive ruling. Id. at 82-83, 668 A.2d at 1059-60 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice opined that due to the inability of
Congress to respond to banking issues on a regular basis, the
agency is authorized to speak on behalf of Congress and should be
given great deference in that capacity. Id. at 80, 668 A.2d at 1058
(Pollock, J., dissenting). Refuting the majority's conclusion that
the OCC's ruling was unpersuasive based on contradicting antecedent rulings, the justice reported that, in recent years, The OCC
had consistently ruled in favor of an expansive definition of interest. Id. at 84, 668 A.2d at 1060 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
Having concluded that "interest" under the NBA includes
nonpercentage-lending costs such as late-payment fees, Justice Pollock concluded that the NBA preempts the RISA's prohibition of
such charges under the Supremacy Clause of the United States
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Constitution. Id. at 84-85, 668 A.2d at 1060-61 (Pollock, J., dissenting). Conceding that the NBA lacked an express preemption
clause, the justice advanced that New Jersey law impermissibly interfered with the NBA's establishment of lending procedures and
its goal of preventing discrimination against national banks. Id. at
87-88, 668 A.2d at 1062 (Pollock, J., dissenting). The justice explained that under the majority's view, New Jersey would be permitted to enact legislation discriminating against national banks in
the area of nonpercentage-interest-rate lending terms, an action
Congress intended to prevent by enacting the NBA. Id. at 88, 668
A.2d at 1062-63 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
In conclusion, Justice Pollock stated that because the NBA regulates interest, and late-payment fees are considered interest, and
due to the discriminatory effect of allowing a state to govern a national bank's lending terms, RISA was preempted by the NBA and
Citibank's imposition of late payment fees should have been upheld without regard to New Jersey law. Id. at 88-90, 668 A.2d at
1062-64 (Pollock, J., dissenting).
Authoring a separate dissent, Justice O'Hern departed from
both the reasoning of the majority and that ofJustice Pollock's dissent. Id. at 92, 668 A.2d at 1064 (O'Hern,J., dissenting). Agreeing
with the majority, Justice O'Hern maintained that the NBA was not
intended by Congress to preempt state law regulating imposition of
late-payment fees. Id. The justice added, however, that Citibank
should have been allowed to charge such fees based upon the
NBA's prohibition of state discrimination against national banks.
Id. Thejustice asserted that the congressional policy in passing the
NBA was focused on equalization, not preemption. Id. at 94, 668
A.2d at 1065 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Therefore, the justice proffered, because New Jersey exempts state credit unions from the
RISA's prohibition of late-payment fees, national banks should be
afforded the same privilege. Id. at 94-96, 668 A.2d at 1065-66
(O'Hern, J., dissenting).
Undoubtedly, critics will condemn the majority's decision as
impractical and potentially crippling to the national banking industry. The majority, however, properly discharged its duty in interpreting the NBA fairly within the confines of the statute,
advancing state consumer protection laws, and declining to displace state law in the absence of an express federal directive.
All too often courts are branded with the responsibility of expanding the language of a statute to meet the needs of lobbying
institutions, conveniently left unaddressed by Congress. The NBA
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is a lengthy statute limiting certain state banking practices and
speaking to many concerns in the already heavily regulated area of
national banking. The statute, however, does not expressly provide
a broad preemption of state banking law. Such an omission is significant, and one may logically infer, intentional. An interpretation authorizing a broad preemption would require a court to
essentially redraft the statute, which, as recognized by the majority,
is a task beyond the duties of the judiciary.
The court should be commended for its independence in declining to preempt state law and upholding the fundamental interest of the state to regulate in the area of consumer protection.
National banking institutions adversely affected by the supreme
court's decision are not, however, left without a remedy. National
lenders may lobby Congress for an amendment to the NBA directing preemption of state laws regulating noninterest-rate lending terms.

Nancy Rapp Westphal

